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The European Parliament and the right of initiative:
Change practice, not powers
Edward Best
Introduction
The Joint Declaration on the Conference on the Future of Europe was adopted on 10 March 
2021, with the title ‘Engaging with Citizens for Democracy – Building a more resilient Europe’. 
The Declaration did not mention institutional issues as such, but the long list of possible points 
for discussion included ‘the Union’s democratic foundations, and how to strengthen democratic 
processes governing the European Union’. 
These discussions will inevitably address the role of the European Parliament (EP). When the 
Conference was launched on 9 May, David Sassoli, President of the EP and co-Chair of the 
Conference, reiterated the demand that the European Parliament should be given the right of 
legislative initiative:
‘I believe that we should reflect on how to strengthen the European Parliament’s capacity and centrality, 
particularly as regards its power of initiative. Like any national parliament, the right of initiative should be 
conferred on the European Parliament so that our institution can make proposals to the Commission and 
the Council, and not just be the recipient. This would help give it a greater role.’ 1
 
This Paper looks at legislative initiative in the EU context from the perspective of democratic 
governance, reviewing and bringing together the roles of the EP, the Commission and other actors. 
It does not take as its starting point practices in national parliaments.2 Indeed, one needs to treat 
such comparisons with care. On the one hand, it is not the case that most national laws originate 
in initiatives of the parliament as such. Practice varies considerably across countries. Members 
(usually individually) may propose bills, and citizens and other actors may have the right to place 
issues on the agenda. However, the right of initiative of parliaments often has limitations, the 
success rate of bills drafted by government is always higher, and often draft initiatives stem from 
the governing parties. 
On the other hand, it should not be assumed that everything that is found in a national political 
system is automatically necessary or appropriate for the EU. It is more helpful to talk about how 
to respect general principles of democratic governance given the specific requirements and 
limitations of the EU context.
The first section recalls briefly why the European Commission has been given its near-monopoly 
of legislative initiative, as well as the ways in which this formal ‘right of initiative’ has been 
somewhat eroded in recent years. It then reviews recent developments in the EP’s very limited 
powers of direct legislative initiative, and even of legislative decision-making, which have now 
brought the adoption of the first-ever Parliament ‘Regulation on its own initiative’.
The second section looks at the state of play concerning the EP’s formal right to request the 
European Commission to submit proposals. The EP has adopted a large number of such 
‘legislative own-initiative reports’ since 2019 in response to the political commitments made by 
Ursula von der Leyen. 
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The third section addresses a number of questions concerning the place and operation of EP 
legislative initiatives in practice, and suggests that it may be time to refocus thinking as to their role.
The Paper concludes that the most important issue to debate with regard to improving the 
democratic quality of EU policy-making is not to consider changing current arrangements in 
the direction of greater formal powers for the EP. Indeed there are several reasons why this is 
not only unlikely but inappropriate.
The priority is rather to discuss how the EP’s formal roles as the directly representative institution 
can be made to interact more effectively with other forms of participation by citizens and 
stakeholders, as well as with the Commission’s consultation processes and evolving approaches 
to policy-making.
The European Parliament’s right of initiative: a legislative ‘first’ and a 
continuing stalemate
The Commission has a near-monopoly of legislative initiative in the EU. This power was given 
to it in order to ensure that the ‘general interest’ would be adequately taken into account in 
negotiations; to serve as a counterweight to differences in size between member countries; and 
to promote policy coherence. Today it is also associated with the ambition to ensure that the EU 
legislates ‘only where and to the extent necessary’: that EU action brings added value; that efforts 
are focused on agreed priorities; and – in the spirit of the ‘foresight’ that now goes hand in hand 
with ‘interinstitutional relations’ in the Commission’s organisation - ‘that short-term actions are 
grounded in long-term objectives’.3
There has been a certain erosion of the Commission’s exclusive rights. The European Parliament 
has the rights outlined below. As part of the negotiations for the Lisbon Treaty it was agreed 
that the initiative would be shared with one-quarter of the Member States in the area of police 
cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; with the European Central Bank in 
certain specific cases; and with the Court of Justice and European Investment Bank for revision 
of parts of their statutes. The Commission has also seen its own shared right of initiative removed 
in the case of foreign and security policy, while the European Council has informally taken on an 
ever stronger role in shaping the EU agenda.
Yet the Commission’s right of legislative remains a key feature of the ‘Community method’ that 
is at the heart of EU policy-making. As the European Parliament has come to acquire stronger 
powers in decision-making, now enjoying equal rights with the Council to adopt most laws under 
the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, it has increasingly demanded the right to propose laws itself.
The EP does have a limited right of initiative. It shares the right of legislative initiative for the 
electoral procedure for the EP, as well as the (strictly speaking, not ‘legislative’) rights to initiate a 
Rule of Law procedure, treaty revision, or the European Council’s decision on the composition of 
the EP.
There are also three cases, all concerning institutional issues rather than the adoption of general 
norms, in which the EP may adopt legislative ‘regulations on its own initiative’. This formula was 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty as part of the institutional symmetry by which ‘special legislative 
procedures’ may take the form of ‘the adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the 
European Parliament with the participation of the Council, or by the latter with the participation of 
the European Parliament’.4 However, the Council must give its consent.
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One of these provisions, on the statute of the Members, has not been used in this post-Lisbon form.
In another case, concerning the statute of the Ombudsman, an EP proposal was adopted 
in February 2019. Agreement was reached on 10 May 2021, leading to adoption of the EP 
draft regulation on 10 June 2021. On 18 June, the Council gave its consent and the 
Commission its opinion. The first-ever EP ‘regulation on its own initiative’ was adopted on 
23 June 2021.
On the other hand, the EP’s proposal on the exercise of the right of inquiry has been blocked, 
and the EP’s current position over the right of initiative may partly reflect frustration with these 
arrangements. 
The Council and the Commission, both of which must give their consent, found unacceptable the 
EP’s 2014 proposal and broke off negotiations in 2018. 
The EP complained in a Resolution of April 2019 that the current wording of the article concerned 
(Art. 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - TFEU) ‘does not oblige the 
Council and the Commission to negotiate, since they are obliged only to give or withhold their 
consent to Parliament’s proposal, and not to negotiate it with a view to reaching a common 
accord’. It also made a more pragmatic plea: it ‘invite[d] the Council and the Commission, if they 
are unable to give their consent to the proposal, to resume negotiations with the newly elected 
Parliament, acknowledging the progress made with the new wording of the proposal presented in 
the non-paper and based on the work carried out by the legal services of the three institutions; 
believes this is a more orderly and systematic text than that adopted in 2014 […]’. 
The EP has continued its pressure. The Constitutional Affairs Committee on 22 April 2021 
formally submitted a question to the Council asking for reassurance that political dialogue will be 
restored so as ‘to establish the appropriate legal framework for implementing Parliament’s right of 
inquiry, which represents a cornerstone of parliamentary democracy’.
The right to request Commission proposals – political progress, but maybe time 
for a rethink
Under Article 225 TFEU the Parliament ‘may, acting by a majority of its component Members, 
request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers 
that a Union act is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.’ This is the same right 
enjoyed by the Council and, since the Lisbon Treaty, by at least one million citizens (European 
Citizens’ Initiatives - ECI). 
The EP also shapes the EU agenda in various other ways. It produces non-legislative own-
initiative reports (INI) which are much more numerous (536 in the 2014-2019 term, compared to 
16 INL), partly because they are much easier to adopt. These also contain requests for action on 
the part of the Commission.
Requests under Article 225 TFEU take the form of legislative own-initiative reports (INL). Each 
request has to include ‘recommendations’ concerning the content, and is accompanied by a 
European Added Value Assessment supporting the case for legislative action. 
The EP has not been satisfied with how the Commission has responded to its requests under Article 
225 TFEU. According to a 2019 EP study, out of 26 cases between 2010 and 2019, the Commission 
followed up the Parliament’s request to some extent with a proposal in only eight cases.5
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The Commission has promised to be more responsive. It is already formally expected to 
respond in detail within three months, as now stipulated in the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement 
on Better Law-Making. 
‘The Commission will give prompt and detailed consideration to requests for proposals for Union acts 
made by the European Parliament or the Council pursuant to Article 225 or Article 241 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union respectively. The Commission will reply to such requests within 
three months, stating the follow-up it intends to give to them by adopting a specific communication. 
If the Commission decides not to submit a proposal in response to such a request, it will inform the 
institution concerned of the detailed reasons, and will provide, where appropriate, an analysis of possible 
alternatives and respond to any issues raised by the co-legislators in relation to analyses concerning 
‘European added value’ and concerning the “cost of non-Europe”.’ 6 
There has been political pressure to go further in its commitment to follow up on recommendations. 
Ursula von der Leyen, nominated by the European Council as candidate for President of the 
European Commission, had to take into account these demands over the right of initiative in 
order to be elected by the European Parliament in July 2019 - and one should recall that she was 
elected by a margin of only nine votes. The Socialists and Democrats, the second largest group 
in Parliament, for example, insisted that she should ‘[e]xplore giving the European Parliament the 
right to initiate legislation’. The letter listed among the conditions for their support that ‘the 
Commission must commit to initiate legislation following the adoption of every legislative initiative 
report adopted by QMV [= a majority of the members]’.7
She said, when presenting her Political Guidelines for the next Commission, that she ‘supports 
a right of initiative for the EP’. However, her words specifically refer to the existing, indirect right, 
and there is a footnote to Article 225 in the speech itself, just in case of doubt.8
Photographer Mathieu Cugnot
Copyright © European Union 2019 - Source: EP
I believe we should give a stronger role to the 
voice of the people, the European Parliament, in 
initiating legislation. I support a right of initiative 
for the European Parliament.
When Parliament, acting by a majority of its 
members, adopts resolutions requesting that the 
Commission submit legislative proposals1, I 
commit to responding with a legislative act, in 
full respect of the proportionality, subsidiarity and 
better law making principles.
To make this process as effective as possible, I 
will ask my Commissioners to work hand-inhand 
with the European Parliament at every stage of 
designing and debating resolutions.
1 Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
Europian Union (TFEU)
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Members of the European Parliament have reacted with enthusiasm to the Commission’s 
apparently more open arms. Between July 2019 and May 2021, a total of 20 INL reports were 
proposed. As of 1 June 2021, ten were awaiting committee decision, and ten had been adopted 
by the plenary (compared to a total of 26 over the whole previous decade). 
The Commission responded formally in all eight cases coming within the deadline in this period. 
The EP resolutions were, as promised, the subject of political debate in College meetings. The 
Commission’s responses were transmitted in the form of Letters of Thanks sent by Vice-
President Maroš Šefčovič to the EP President, David Sassoli, with copy to the Chair of the 
Conference of Committee Chairs, Antonio Tajani. 
The INL reports and the Commission’s responses are summarised in the table.
There has not yet been any formal assessment of the Commission’s responsiveness on the part 
of the Parliament. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is appreciation of the formal political 
attitude that is being demonstrated, but a feeling that this is still not translated into legislative 
proposals, this being the yardstick that is generally applied.
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Source: Author’s compilation based on information on European Parliament, Legislative Observatory; European 
Commission, weekly meeting reports of the College, last accessed 8 June 2021.
Note: The Commission’s responses to these resolutions have not been published on the EP’s ‘legislative obser-
vatory’. At the time of writing (early June 2021) four letters were available on the Commission Document Register. 
The notes in the table therefore refer to the written reports from the College weekly meetings available on the 
Commission website.
Table: EP requests for Commission proposal (legislative own-initiative reports), 
July 2019 – May 2021
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There is also some sense that it is actually less helpful, in terms of identifying the Commission’s 
response to specific elements in the report, to have to wait until a political debate takes place, 
towards the end of the deadline, and then to receive a political text rather than the actual 
technical document that gives a point-by-point reaction. Since autumn 2020, these documents 
have not transmitted or posted on the EP’s Legislative Observatory as the ‘Commission response 
to text adopted in plenary’.9
In only one case – in fact the first - was the response effectively to reject a request. The College 
report suggests that the responsible Commissioner thought that the proposed contingency plan for 
MFF beneficiaries would be counter-productive in the circumstances, and no action was taken.10
Where legislative proposals have subsequently been adopted in the policy areas concerned, the 
Commission has explicitly referred to the five INL reports (and other EP resolutions) respectively 
relating to these areas. 
-  The Explanatory Memorandum proposing the Digital Services Act in December 2020 
emphasises that ‘the Commission has taken account of the issues identified in the European 
Parliament’s own initiative reports and analysed the proposals therein’ and summarises the 
EP’s points in the first section.
-  The EP’s legislative initiatives are referred to in the Commission’s April 2021 proposal on 
artificial intelligence, together with requests made by the Council and the European Council. 
-  In the case of digital finance, the Commission had already adopted a proposal, but had 
referred to the EP’s ongoing work in the presentation of its September 2020 proposal on 
markets in crypto-assets.
The INL concerning deforestation was adopted at a time when the Commission was engaged in 
an online public consultation for a forthcoming initiative in this area and may therefore be referred 
to when the Commission produces its proposal.
In the case of the right to disconnect, the nature of the response is ambiguous. The INL was 
accompanied by a full draft directive. The Commission could respond positively to the resolution 
while not taking up this draft, pointing to the statement in the EP resolution that EU legislation 
should only come after three years, following implementation of the autonomous agreement on 
digitalisation agreed in June 2020 among the European social partners.11
The European Parliament’s legislative initiatives – some issues and perspectives
The importance of Parliament’s legislative initiatives, and the responsiveness of the Commission, 
are often assessed in terms of whether or not the result is a legislative proposal. This is natural 
given the way in which Article 225 TFEU is written, as well as Parliament’s institutional interest, 
but prompts a number of questions. 
Requests, recommendations or parallel actions?
First, this approach implies that the issue is whether or not the Commission agrees to initiate 
preparation of a legislative proposal in response to a request from Parliament. In many cases, 
this is simply not a realistic scenario. 
This seems to have been the case, for example, with the proposal for the Digital Services Act 
(DSA). Dealing with digital challenges is one of the main shared priorities for the EU and has 
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been the subject of initiatives of all sorts for years. Indeed, the DSA amends the ‘e-Commerce 
Directive’ from the year 2000. The elaboration of this legislative initiative was already mentioned 
in the Political Guidelines in July 2019, and was confirmed in the Commission’s 2020 Work 
Programme published on 29 January 2020. 
The EP committed considerable resources, producing two legislative initiative reports, 
and one non-legislative report. Six committees were fully associated in the process. The 
Recommendations in annex to the IMCO report take up 14 pages. 
The final annex attached to the Commission’s impact assessment states that the ‘Commission 
analysed the reports while conducting the impact assessments’, and a table ‘maps the main 
areas and sections in the impact assessment reports where the calls from the European 
Parliament are addressed.’ 12
Yet Parliament’s input was only one source among many (it comes after 200 pages of information 
about the results of Commission consultations) and the table is mainly an exercise in ex post 
comparison between two parallel processes. In his Letter of Thanks Vice-President Šefčovič 
writes that he was ‘glad to note a high degree of convergence between the main objectives set 
out in the resolution and the objectives of the Commission’s proposals.’ 13 (emphasis added)
The Report from the IMCO Committee (Internal Market and Consumer Affairs) was tabled on 
almost exactly the same day (7 October 2020) that the Commission’s draft impact assessment 
report was submitted (8 October) to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB). It was supported by 
a European Added Value Assessment carried out by the European Parliamentary Research 
Service. This document (328 pages) contains legal and technical analyses that present a different 
set of policy options and policy actions.14
The Commission’s letter continues: ‘It is also worth noting that the Commission engaged with the 
European Parliament from the very beginning of the development of the resolution.’ It is hard to 
judge how much direct interaction there may have been between the two processes in the DSA 
case. The Commission impact assessment does refer to two separate studies for the EP on options 
for reform of the e-commerce Directive that were published already in April and May 2020.15
Whatever may have been the case with the DSA, however, this is clearly the direction in which 
the Commission thinks that things should go, following up on the intention expressed by Mrs 
von der Leyen that her Commissioners should work ‘hand-in-hand’ with the EP in drawing up 
the resolutions.
The key point is that these are not and should not be separate processes. But in that case, does 
it make sense to look at this as the exercise of a Parliamentary power to request an initiative?
Where the Commission has already announced that it is going to work on a legislative initiative, 
and even more so if the Commission has already adopted a proposal, a report calling for the 
Commission to submit a proposal may be practically ineffectual because of timing (as well as 
conceptually confusing).  
The danger of duplication and the need for coherent interaction
Moreover, if the Commission is already engaged in an Impact Assessment, it may well be asked 
how much value is added by a parallel European Added Value Assessment. Is there not a danger 
of either duplication or incoherence? 
In the DSA case, the EP reports and their supporting studies were not entirely consistent in 
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their conclusions. This reflects differences between committees as well as the fact that INL 
reports tend to be shaped by the need to pool individual requests, making them overloaded and 
complex.16 This is not to suggest that the Commission’s work is necessarily superior to what may 
come from the Parliament. In the DSA case, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board was in fact rather 
critical of the draft and required significant improvements: ‘The policy options are not complete 
and not sufficiently developed. They lack detail and their content is not well explained. […] The 
report does not clearly present the evidence that leads to the choice of the preferred policy 
option. The assessment of compliance costs is insufficient.’ 17
Studies conducted by the EP itself have pointed to the ‘need to streamline procedures and 
working methods if necessary when revisiting the interinstitutional agreements, on the one hand, 
and to focus on follow up and monitoring, on the other, in order to increase the quality 
and homogeneity in the constructive dialogue between Parliament and the Commission.’ 18
It should be noted that there are different views within the European Parliament in this respect. 
Most MEPs to the centre/right of the EP (most EPP, ECR and most ID), as well as some Renew 
MEPs, tend to support the idea of evaluating each incoming idea against the backdrop of impact 
and added value assessments. Most MEPs on the centre/Left /Green side of the EP, on the other 
hand, tend to argue that there is and should be a difference between the ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ 
basis for Commission proposals and the political, majoritarian grounds for Parliament initiatives.19
Expressions of political preference cannot be replaced by technical analyses if governance is 
to be considered democratic (and new forms of EU governance are indeed producing tensions 
between technocracy and democracy).20 Yet they are usually subject to checks and balances, 
or other constitutional limitations, in national contexts, and it is a very real and topical challenge 
at all levels of governance to defend deliberative democracy against both technocracy and 
populism.21
The European Parliament’s function in directly representing citizens and expressing political 
concerns has become an essential component of EU governance. Yet it remains only one of 
the different kinds of interests that have to be reconciled through the ‘institutional balance’ 
established by the treaties. 
Interinstitutional cooperation rather than separation of powers
Indeed, the push for a more independent right of initiative for the EP goes against the trend – and 
the formal interinstitutional agreement – to work together as early as possible at all levels and at 
all stages. Following the 2016 IIA on Better Law-Making, the EU now has a formal multiannual 
strategic framework (the first-ever Joint Conclusions on Policy Objectives and Priorities for 
2020-2024 adopted in December 2020) and an annual cycle in which the Commission receives 
input from Parliament and Council in shaping the Commission Work Programme – in which 
new legislative initiatives are announced - leading to an annual Joint Declaration on Legislative 
Priorities for the following year.
In this perspective, it would seem more fruitful and appropriate to pull back from the idea of 
strengthening the Parliament’s separate power to present justified requirements for new initiatives 
(and even more from the possibility that Parliament could become responsible for assessing 
issues and drafting proposals on the same basis as the Commission). One should rather think  
about optimising ways to interact in practice. 
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EP legislative own -initiative reports and other actors 
Finally, the potential of INL reports needs to be seen in the context of EP interactions with other 
actors and other processes of interest representation and participation.
There has been discussion of cooperation with national parliaments, particularly in relation to 
the idea of linking an EP request under Article 225 TFEU to a ‘green card’ by which a certain 
number of national chambers could jointly express their positive support for a Commission 
initiative (as compared to the ‘yellow card’ of warning to the Commission that is available to 
national parliaments under the subsidiarity control mechanism applicable to EU legislative 
initiatives). That idea, formally presented in 2015, has not been accepted by the Commission, 
however, and it was in the end not clear that either the EP or national parliaments would really 
see much benefit for themselves in joint action.22 Inter-parliamentary cooperation between the 
European and the national levels is indeed becoming stronger, especially with regard to newer 
areas in which EU and national authorities act jointly, such as the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny 
Groups for Europol or the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Yet there has been explicit 
concern not to confuse the distribution of competences between national and European levels 
when it comes specifically to EU legislative processes.23
The relationship with the European social partners (the representative organisations of 
employers and workers at European level) raises other questions. These relate to the interaction 
between forms of representation in democratic governance: territorial, as in the case of the EP, 
and ‘functional’ as in the case of the social partners. Under the European Social Dialogue, the 
signatories of a European agreement may choose to implement this on an ‘autonomous’ basis 
– as was the case in June 2020 with the framework agreement on digitalisation - or may jointly
request the Commission to submit the text as a proposal for adoption by the Council under EU 
law (usually as a Council directive). The EP has no formal role in this other than to be ‘informed’.24 
Interaction between the EP and the social partners in the promotion of legislative initiatives 
has been seen as one path to asserting the EP’s role in such legislative processes, while also 
reinforcing overall representative legitimacy.25
The interaction with other actors of EP requests under Article 225 TFEU is perhaps most 
important with regard to European Citizens’ Initiatives (ECI). It is already stated in the revised 
ECI Regulation itself that the EP will not only organise a public hearing for a successful initiative 
with the presence of the co-legislators, but also ‘assess the political support for the initiative’.26
The EP Rules of Procedure now foresee that the EP may use its formal right under Article 225 
TFEU to take up successful initiatives that were not followed up with legislative initiatives by 
the Commission. The EP adopted a non-legislative resolution of 10 June 2021 supporting the 
requests made in the ECI End the cage age that had been presented to the Commission after 
successfully gathering over one million valid signatures. It was expected that, if the Commission 
were not to follow up on the legislative initiatives when it formally responded by 15 July, there 
could be the first case of the EP adopting a legislative initiative directly related to an ECI.
It should not be assumed that this would in itself convince the Commission. In the case of 
another successful ECI, One of Us, the Court has recently ruled that: ‘in exercising its powers of 
legislative initiative, the Commission must be allowed broad discretion, in so far as, through that 
exercise, it is called upon, pursuant to Article 17(1) TEU, to promote the general interest of the 
Union by carrying out, possibly, the difficult task of reconciling divergent interests. It follows that 
the Commission must be allowed broad discretion in deciding whether or not to take an action 
following an ECI.’ 27 (emphasis added).
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The sequence of interaction between Parliament and interests may be different. The EP INL 
report of October 2020 on deforestation was prominently referred to in the detailed NGO 
recommendations for the new regulation supported by over one million signatories that were 
submitted in December ‘together4forests’). This was not an ECI but a response to a consultation 
opened by the Commission with a view to possible new legislation between 03 September 
2020 and 10 December 2020, building on its Communication of July 2019 and the initial online 
consultation (asking for feedback on what is known as the Inception Impact Assessment) in 
February and March 2020.
There has naturally been concern that the EP could be used as a channel for particular interests 
(and conversely that ECIs could be used as a vehicle for MEPs’ interests, hence the stipulation 
in the ECI Regulation that MEPs may not be counted among the minimum seven members of a 
citizens’ committee). 
However, the fact that an INL has to be adopted by an absolute majority of the members of the 
EP may rather be seen as helping to confirm whether or not the citizens’ initiative is really of 
broad public concern and does enjoy widespread political support.
Conclusions
This Paper has reviewed recent developments in the European Parliament’s direct and 
indirect rights of legislative initiative in the perspective of strengthening democratic European 
governance. It concludes that it is, with one possible exception, more important to review practice 
and presentation, rather than change formal institutional powers.
The one exception is the need to resolve the impasse over the powers of EP committees of 
inquiry. This may not only help to defuse the Parliament’s concerns over the right of initiative. It is 
also reasonable to assume that the installation of credible arrangements for Parliamentary inquiry 
would be welcomed by citizens as a positive advance in one fundamental aspect of democratic 
governance, that of accountability. It may also be assumed that this would seem at least as 
important to citizens as whether or not the Parliament has the right of direct legislative initiative.
It is very unlikely, and arguably undesirable, that the Member States would change the treaty in 
order to give a full right of legislative initiative to the EP, understood as a parallel power to that of 
the Commission.
There is a strong general preference among the Member States not to be obliged to deal with 
proposals for new legislation that they might consider to be unnecessary and/or ill-prepared, 
whether they originate with citizens, social partners or the European Parliament (or the 
Commission, for that matter). They are, on balance, happier to urge the Commission to play the 
role of ensuring that new initiatives reflect priorities that are agreed across the institutions to be 
in the general and the long-term interest, rather than responding to short-term political or sectoral 
preferences; and that proposals are then duly assessed in terms of subsidiarity, proportionality 
and better law-making. 
There is also consensus as to the need to improve the quality and efficiency of these 
assessments. This is not likely to be achieved by encouraging the duplication of capacities in the 
EP and parallel processes of technical assessment and evaluation (ex ante or ex post), as would 
almost inevitably be the consequence of formalising a separate right of initiative for the EP.
It is also unlikely, and perhaps inappropriate, to consider introducing changes to Article 225 
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TFEU that would give EP requests binding effect. It is more important to rethink the nature of 
the exercise; to review the nature of interaction between Parliament and Commission, including 
on the practical level; and to develop further the contribution than be made to democratic 
governance through interaction with other mechanisms of citizen participation.
Coupled with the technical and legal assessments conducted by the Commission as part of 
its right of initiative, this kind of interaction does represent a new and promising way in which 
representative and participatory mechanisms may interact in a structured way to contribute to a 
democratic upgrade of EU policy-making.
This is very much in the spirit of the Conference on the Future of Europe itself. As was pointed 
out by members of the Executive Board when adopting its Rules of Procedure on 9 May, 
the Conference has an ‘innovative nature […] combining representative and participatory 
democracy’.28 It is an approach that needs to be promoted as widely as possible if citizens are to 
believe that the invitation to greater engagement is going to last.
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